Joshua Keating at Foreign Policy:
The International Atomic Energy Agency says Iranian negotiators have agreed to a draft proposal to ship most of its uranium to Russia for enrichment. The deal must still be accepted by Tehran, as well as the government of France, Russia, and the United States.
Details have not been released, but the agreement likely involves Iran shipping 75 percent of its enriched uranium stockpile to Russia for further enrichment. If Iran followed through, this would reduce its stockpile to below what would be required to create a nuclear weapon. However, Iran could likely replace that stockpile “in little over a year,” according to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security.
“I very much hope that people see the big picture, see that this agreement could open the way for a complete normalization of relations between Iran and the International community,” said IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei
Laura Rozen at Politico:
The comments came after three days of talks among representatives from the U.S., France, Russia, and Iran at the atomic agency. The draft plan has to be agreed by the countries’ capitals. ElBaradei said he had set Friday as the goal for countries to confirm the agreement.
Earlier this week, Iran had reportedly raised objections to France’s role in converting the further enriched uranium into nuclear medical isotopes, saying France had previously reneged on delivery of nuclear fuel from a consortium of which it has a share. The issue was solved almost twenty years ago bilaterally, a diplomat said. It’s not yet clear how the issue has been resolved in the latest plan.
While ElBaradei specified few details, diplomats told the Associated Press ”that it was essentially the original proposal drawn up by the IAEA that would commit Tehran to shipping 75 percent of its enriched uranium stockpile to Russia for further enrichment.”
If implemented, such a plan would conceivably put several months back on the clock to try to resolve international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. The deal seemingly offers Iran the appearance of de facto international recognition of its enrichment program, if not acceptance. It also gives Iran and world powers a chance to see if the other comes through on their side of the deal.
“France and Russia have expressed their willingness to do this. We are not seeking it out,” said French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner of the deal. He also said that the 1.2 kilos of Iranian low enriched uranium must leave Iran “before the end of the year.”
Andrew Sullivan has a round-up. Out of his round-up, Spencer Ackerman:
This would represent the first time that anyone has succeeded in putting time back on the Iranian nuclear clock. It would be a major diplomatic victory for Obama, and for the Forces Of Good in general. A nuclear Iran is in no one’s interest.
If Iran does indeed ship the whole 2,600 pounds at once, I think we see the contours of the “least worst” outcome, where diplomacy can gum up the works a bit in Iran. Ultimately, Iran can still cheat and wiggle its way toward a bomb but – like North Korea during the 1990s Agreed Framework – they’ll have to work their way there along a more torturous path. Not ideal, but with an Iranian population clearly hostile to its current regime, any play for time is valuable.
Keep in mind that Security Council gridlock pretty much mirrors 2006 circumstances; when Iran rejected a similar proposal by the Russians to enrich Iranian uranium. Western leverage appears no greater today than it was back then, and the differences between then and now are subtle. One reason for the sea change is the domestic discomfort inside Iran. Still smarting from the June 12 unrest, Tehran has some tough decisions to make in the coming months on public gas subsidies and declining oil prices are limiting Iranian options—to fulfill domestic consumption needs, the country must diversify its energy production. Multilateral or unilateral sanctions are not something they can afford at this time.
But I believe it was Washington’s acknowledgment of those energy needs and nuclear rights that has made a big difference in getting Tehran to play ball on this. To be fair, President Bush also paid similar lip service to Iran’s nuclear rights; but without direct talks Iran had little reason to move on the issue and calm Western nerves (again, that divided Security Council matter).
The Iranian regime wants the bomb for security and regional legitimacy. If the West can secure for them the first two items, Tehran may be willing to bend on the first.
Not from Sully’s round-up:
It’s a positive step. On the other hand, Iran’s ability to enrich LEU into weapons grade uranium is a little fuzzy right now, so it’s possible that this costs them nothing at all. It will take them upwards of a year to replace the stockpile of LEU they send out of the country, but if they’re a year away from mastering the full enrichment cycle then this deal doesn’t actually slow them down any.
Still, this is good news. It’s not great news, and I wouldn’t take it as a sign of a new era in Iranian relations or anything. But it’s better than nothing.
