Major offensive under way.
James Joyner has a round-up of all the mainstream news sources.
Brian Doherty in Reason
Rajiv Chandrasekaran in WaPo:
Thousands of U.S. Marines descended upon the volatile Helmand River valley in helicopters and armored convoys early Thursday, mounting an operation that represents the first large-scale test of the U.S. military’s new counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
The operation will involve about 4,000 troops from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which was dispatched to Afghanistan this year by President Obama to combat a growing Taliban insurgency in Helmand and other southern provinces. The Marines, along with an Army brigade that is scheduled to arrive later this summer, plan to push into pockets of the country where NATO forces have not had a presence. In many of those areas, the Taliban has evicted local police and government officials and taken power.
Once Marine units arrive in their designated towns and villages, they have been instructed to build and live in small outposts among the local population. The brigade’s commander, Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Nicholson, said his Marines will focus their efforts on protecting civilians from the Taliban and on restoring Afghan government services, instead of mounting a series of hunt-and-kill missions against the insurgents.
Two Spencer Ackerman posts, here and here. Ackerman:
While I’m inclined to agree with the argument that a counterinsurgency strategy is the most plausible path to a counterterrorism objective, counterinsurgency is so stunningly complex and Afghanistan is in such dire straits that it’s rather legitimate to fear, as Michael does, that the means are going to consume the end. I’m not persuaded that Afghanistan strategy is subject to mission creep yet — remember the war from 2002 to 2007? — and have found Michael’s posts on the subject more valuable as intellectual checks on COINdinista enthusiasm than I have as a guide for understanding strategy, but it would be irresponsible not to consider that the fear could manifest itself.
And via Ackerman, Andrew Exum:
I’ll just repeat my earlier suggestion that the Administration ensure it has all the resources it needs if it intends to carry out population-centric counterinsurgency in southern Afghanistan (or anywhere else). The lack of Afghan government forces and civilian reconstruction experts doesn’t bode particularly well for any lasting effect from this operation, and it’s deeply disappointing that we’ve known about these shortfalls for so long and still can’t seem to do much about them.
Michael Cohen at Democracy Arsenal
And in related news, Bill Roggio has a post up about the media and the captured soldier.
Around The Sphere 